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The current state of scientific knowledge on resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) contracting 
is unclear and based on inadequate empirical grounds. As a result, it is not easy to tell a R4I 
contract apart from other forms of international business transactions, let alone describe it 
in a comprehensive, accurate and meaningful way. Such state of affairs is concerning given 
the dramatic transformative impact of R4I contracts. This article sheds light on R4I 
contracts and proposes a broad framework for analyzing these multibillion-dollar deals. It 
looks to the contracting parties’ intentions – as expressly set out in the texts of contractual 
and official documents – as the decisive element in getting the big and full picture of a new 
kind of deal that has been responsible for tremendous infrastructural development on the 
African continent. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is considerable confusion about resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) dealings in Africa. 
Are these multibillion-dollar deals swaps, barter, loans, investments or aid? Are they 
steeped in a ‘long history of natural resource-based transaction in the oil industry’ (Foster 
et al., 2009, p.42) or have they emerged as a phenomenon of the twenty-first century? Are 
they a combination or all of the above? Are they contracts at all? The situation is so 
complicated today that it is difficult to see the forest for the trees and to tell what is a R4I 
contract and what is not. Even in instances where a R4I contract has been unambiguously 
identified, it is a tall order to describe its terms in a systematic, accurate, comprehensive 
and theoretically sound manner. Moreover, assumptions that R4I contracts are not new or 
‘not so new’ have led experts to give descriptions that do not square with contract law 
theory and that are wildly inconsistent with experience and the available terms of real-life 
R4I contracts. For example, Louis T. Wells describes the ‘not-so-new’ R4I contracts (2013) 
as ‘equivalent to loans’ (2014, p. 83), a ‘not-so-new’ assumption that obscures reality and 
compounds the analytic problem of identifying and characterizing R4I contracts. 
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The primary purpose of this article is thus to shed light on resource-for-
infrastructure contracting. To dispel the confusion about R4I contracts, this article 
proposes a broad framework for identifying, analyzing and negotiating the essential, salient 
and common terms of R4I contracts. In short, R4I contracts creatively combine a mining or 
oil venture and an infrastructure project in order to extract minerals or hydrocarbons and 
to pay for major infrastructure projects with revenues generated from those extractive 
activities. Under this ‘ring-fenced’ arrangement, the host state gets the infrastructure and 
the foreign investor gets the extracted resources. 
‘How much is known for sure about R4I contracts?’ is the central question this 
article speaks to. The question relates to the current state of scientific knowledge on R4I 
contracts and to the necessity of establishing a firm knowledge base on which to rest 
ongoing debates over those contracts. This research article places these debates on a 
secure contract law foundation by relying on the intentions of the contractants to analyze 
R4I contracts. 
 
 
2. Survey of the Existing Literature 
 
2.1 Significance of the Inquiry 
 
The whole purpose of surveying the existing literature on R4I contracts is to provide an 
overview of the recurrent problems in identifying and specifying the R4I model; the 
overview then serves to resolve those problems systematically and comprehensively. This 
crucial process culminates into the analytical framework recommended in this article. 
Ultimately, the true significance of the article lies in the fact that it fills a gap in the 
literature. It tries to bring greater clarity to the muddled theory of resource-for-
infrastructure contracts and approaches that theory through the magnifying lenses of 
contract law. 
It is imperative to gain a detailed understanding of the terms of R4I contracts, which 
can be an uphill task as the literature is patchy, distorting, confusing and at times 
contradictory. While it is not worth emphasizing each and every provision of an R4I 
contract, it is important to focus on essential and salient terms. Given the myriad ways R4I 
contracts are depicted in the literature, it becomes necessary to authoritatively describe 
the basic organization of R4I contracts and, appropriately, their ‘essential’ terms. ‘Salient’ 
terms are those that raise extensive discussion or controversy. They are, at the same time, 
terms over which the contracting parties are most likely to lock horns in the course of 
intense negotiations. 
Because R4I contracts have a dramatic transformative impact on the economies of 
host countries, it would be irresponsible to settle for vague and incomplete accounts of R4I 
dealings. To be sure, Angola (4,5 billion US dollars),40 the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
                                                          
40 The initial amount was 2 billion US dollars. Subsequently, China Eximbank added 2.5 billion US 
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(DRC)(9 billion US dollars)41 and Ghana (3 billion US dollars) attracted – thanks to R4I 
contracts – the largest finance in a single investment since their respective independence. 
Rough estimates of signed R4I contracts in Africa hover around 30 billion US dollars 
(Halland et al., 2014, p. 5). 
The literature is dominated by the contributions of journalists, political scientists, 
economists and development experts, among others. Scarcely any study addresses R4I 
contracts from a contract law vantage point. The lack of such relevant and much-needed 
perspectives adds to the confusion about R4I contracts. Since the first legal treatise on R4I 
contracts, published in 2010 (Zongwe, 2010), about two other treatises tackled the issue of 
R4I from a legal point of view. Research by Zongwe (2011) and Beardsworth & Schmidt 
(Halland et al., 2014) analyzed R4I contracts from a legal angle and employed law-and-
economics perspectives. Zongwe compares R4I contracts with traditional investment 
contracts (2010) and puts forth R4I contracts as a model to optimize China’s mining 
investments in Africa (2011). Beardsworth & Schmidt discuss the project finance aspects of 
the infrastructure component of R4I contracts. Those treatises all note the multiple names 
and descriptions given to R4I deals, but none takes a shot at formulating a theory that 
unifies the multiple descriptions of the deals. This article is an attempt to formulate such 
theory. 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
As shown later in the article, R4I deals are best described as contracts. Methodologically, 
this observation implies that the intentions of the parties to the contract must be the 
starting point in efforts to identify and analyze R4I transactions. It is a practical method of 
gaining a bird’s-eye view of R4I contracts and formulating a unified theory that connects 
and explains the individual components of the contracts under scrutiny. 
Insisting on the intentions of the contracting parties is consistently and 
overwhelmingly supported by contract law theory. The parties’ intentions are the basis of 
contractual liability and the decisive element in ascertaining the general structure of a 
contract. The sustained emphasis on the intentions of the contractants has the added 
advantage of avoiding the sort of misunderstandings that so pervade the literature on R4I 
contracts. In reading the mental states of the parties, whether a subjective or objective 
approach is used, misunderstandings and other evidentiary challenges can be overcome 
with a ‘paper trail’ (see Posner, 2011, p. 31). In other words, the ideal place to find the 
parties’ intentions is in the express provisions of a written contract. Searching for the 
declared intentions of the parties in the texts of R4I contracts and official documentary 
evidence is the methodology that forms the backbone of the analytical framework set in 
this article. 
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valued at 6 billion US dollars. 
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3. The Analytical Framework 
 
3.1 Pure versus Disparate Types 
 
Before going into the essentials of the R4I model, a distinction must be drawn between the 
pure type and the disparate type of R4I contracts. In her interesting study on R4I contracts, 
BreeAna Jones (2013, p. 15ff) did not draw that distinction and mistakenly included the 
Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Zambia and the joint venture, 
China-Africa Overseas Leather Products, between Ethiopia and China. As she acknowledged 
herself, the Sino-Ethiopian project is not a “purely” R4I investment (Jones, 2013, p. 21). In 
fact, none of those two Sino-African transactions are R4I investments. 
The pure type is exemplified by the 2004 Angola-China R4I contract, whereas the 
disparate type is illustrated by the 2007 Ghana-China R4I contract, also known as the Bui 
Dam project. Distinguishing between the two types answers the question as to whether R4I 
contracts are a new way of structuring international business transactions. The pure type 
of R4I contract is a new contractual phenomenon whereas its disparate variation is not. 
Unlike pure types, disparate R4I contracts stray into contested territory: they defy 
classification and are easily confused with one or more traditional contractual models in 
international economic law. The distinction between the two types will become clear as the 
essential terms of R4I contracts are examined. 
 
3.2 The Parties 
 
One of the first things that must be looked at when analyzing a deal suspected of being – or 
presented as – a R4I contract is the identity of the parties to the contract. In national 
reconstruction projects, R4I contracts are state-to-state contractual undertakings between 
a resource company of a host state and a consortium of companies owned by another state 
investing in the host country. In smaller investments, R4I contracts may involve profit-
maximizing private firms. To sum up, states or state-owned entities are parties to typical 
R4I contracts.  
The state-to-state strategy is of incredible importance given that the direct 
involvement of the two states has several far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of 
R4I contracts. In particular, it mitigates political risks in developing countries and it 
drastically lessens the very high coordination costs that a consortium of private firms 
would incur if they joined forces to design and implement a R4I contract. 
However, except for China, virtually no one among capital-exporting nations can 
actively engage its state-owned corporations in a R4I deal as developer-lender-contractor. 
Like Paul Collier pointed out (2014, p. 71), China has a ‘monopoly’ in the supply of such 
deals. In R4I contracting, investors and capital exporters would also need deep pockets, an 
appetite for risk or the ‘animal spirits’ that John Maynard Keynes invoked in his General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
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3.3 The Agreement 
 
The Chatham House report Thirst for African Oil (Vines et al., 2009) on ‘oil-for-
infrastructure’ in Angola and Nigeria, reflects a flawed understanding of the nature of R4I 
agreements. It mistook related yet unlinked political deals (memoranda of understanding) 
and a group of contracts (rights of first refusal and oil block sales) for R4I contracts in 
Nigeria. It first indicated that there were ‘no legally binding agreements’ tying the 
development of the oil blocks to the delivery of infrastructure (Vines et al., 2009, p. 27-8). 
But the report made the link anyway between the deals and the contracts on the basis of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s stated intentions to trade oil for infrastructure. Though the 
report was right to take into account the intentions of President Obasanjo, it should have 
paid equal attention to the terms of the written agreements.  
The dominant presence of two states in R4I contracts may allow the inference that 
the agreements the states entered into are treaties, with all the ramifications that go along 
with that. Despite the heavy engagement of states and state-owned entities in R4I 
agreements, they are not treaties. Sticking to the methodology adopted in this article, it is 
evident from the text of available R4I contracts that the state parties to these agreements 
intend to act in a commercial capacity. This is the case notwithstanding the intrinsically 
and prominently political nature of these deals. Incidentally, contrary to a belief 
widespread in mostly Western media that ‘weak African states are ruthlessly exploited by 
resource-hungry Asian tigers’, government negotiators and leaders have in several host 
countries asserted a remarkable degree of autonomy at the bargaining table (see Vines et 
al., 2009, p. 3). 
It therefore flows from the foregoing that R4I agreements are contracts. A ‘contract’ 
is conceived in this article as the terms of economic exchanges, usually with consequences 
on property rights. In this economics-inspired conception of contracts, it is assumed that 
the parties have expressed a firm intention to form and be bound by the R4I contract in 
conformity with the law of contract of the applicable legal system. 
 
3.4 The Essential Terms  
 
A R4I contract is an elaborate and complex network of agreements between a host state 
and another state investing in the host state (1) to develop and extract natural resources 
(minerals and/or hydrocarbons) and (2) to use the revenues generated or expected from 
the extraction of resources in order to pay for (3) major infrastructure projects in the host 
state. Stated differently, the essential terms of a R4I contract are the resource development 
agreement, the loan agreement and the agreement on infrastructure development. These 
agreements are mutually interdependent in packaged or pure types of R4I contracts 
whereas they are loosely associated or otherwise varied in unbundled or disparate types of 
R4I contracts. 
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a) Resource Development Agreement  
 
The parties agree that the foreign investor will prospect for minerals or/and hydrocarbons, 
conduct feasibility studies, and extract and export those resources. The host state issues all 
the necessary licenses, which set out an implementation schedule and a clear fiscal plan 
that provides sufficient financial flows to fund the infrastructure projects. The resource 
development agreement may take the form of a production sharing agreement. 
 
b) Loan Agreement  
 
In exchange for the promise to grant rights to specified natural resources, the investing 
foreign state gives a loan, often on concessional terms (this is why it is sometimes seen as 
aid (see Alves, 2013, pp. 7-8)), to the host state for the construction of infrastructure to be 
built by contractors owned by the foreign state. The loan is directly paid out to the 
contractor and the developer, and never reaches state coffers. It follows that the many 
experts who portray R4I contracts as tantamount to loans miss the full picture; they look 
only at a part (the loan), however essential, instead of seeing the whole elephant (the R4I 
contract), of which the loan is but a part. 
 
c) Infrastructure Development Agreement  
 
The parties agree that the foreign investor will construct or/and rehabilitate infrastructure. 
The host state selects the infrastructure to be developed. In the majority of packaged R4I 
cases, the agreement is to build either nationwide or economy-structuring infrastructure. 
In the 2004 Angola-China contract, the agreement was to construct and reconstruct 
infrastructure nationwide, for instance, the rehabilitation of municipalities and hundreds of 
kilometers of water supply; and the construction of roads, railways, bridges, ditches, 
houses and a drainage system. In the 2008 DRC-China contract (hereinafter the ‘Sicomines’ 
deal), the agreement features the construction of economy-structuring infrastructure: 
roads and railways that connect different parts of the vast country, thereby boosting 
domestic trade. In the 2011 Ghana-China R4I contract, the agreement is to develop 
ambitious public works (such as a railway, a harbor and a multi-modal transportation 
system) with revenues coming from the drilling of oil in the Jubilee Oil Field in Ghana.  
Nevertheless, R4I contracts may provide for small-scale projects, like the water 
supply system to be built in Kinshasa (DRC) in return for copper, as stipulated in the R4I 
contract between the DRC and a consortium of South Korean corporations (hereinafter the 
‘Musoshi’ agreement). The infrastructure agreement in a R4I contract may be informed by 
traditional infrastructure contract models. 
 
 
3.5 The Salient Terms 
 
a) Confidentiality Clauses 
 
Confidentiality clauses further complicate the analytic problem of distinguishing and 
characterizing R4I contracts since they restrict access to the terms of actual R4I contracts. 
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The debate over confidentiality clauses boils down to the question whether confidentiality 
is an inherent attribute of R4I contracts or a deliberate choice of either contracting party. 
Some protagonists say that R4I contracts are inherently opaque, implying that R4I 
contracts are bad for host countries and must therefore be shunned. Others believe that 
confidentiality may be ‘simply a habit’ (Beardsworth & Schmidt, 2014, p. 45) and that 
parties should be encouraged through initiatives, like the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), to disclose the terms of the contracts.  
Demands for transparency are hard to gainsay as the benefits of sunlight clauses are 
self-explanatory, the prevention of corruption, white elephants as well as the rigorous 
evaluation of contracts being three obvious examples. This is all the more the reason, 
considering the integral role of the state in the deals and the massive amounts of resources 
at stake. On the other hand, confidentiality clauses do protect legitimate interests: trade 
secrets, intellectual property rights, etc.  
A few host governments have partially disclosed the contents of R4I deals. The 
Angolan Cabinet made public a series of resolutions that listed the infrastructure projects 
and their costs. The government in the DRC disclosed the framework agreement of the 
Sicomines deal and the memorandum of agreement of the Musoshi contract. In Ghana, 
selected key terms of the Bui Dam and the 2011 contracts have been reproduced in official 
documents in the public domain.  
Expecting full transparency is – in spite of its indisputable blessings – hopelessly 
naïve at this juncture. Even if Liberia has embraced the practice of publicly disclosing its 
mining contracts, strict confidentiality clauses are commonplace in the extractive 
industries under every contractual model. 
 
b) Key Financial and Valuation Provisions 
 
Compared to other contractual models, the competitive edge of the R4I model is that it 
provides higher, quicker and cheaper capital. Unfortunately, bounded rationality, limited 
computing abilities and imperfect information make it hard for both contracting sides to 
determine the real monetary value of the loan, the resource deal and the infrastructure 
project, or to price in political and financial risks correctly. It thus may be as difficult to 
ensure that R4I contracts offer better value for money. This is a possible explanation for the 
controversy that has surrounded certain provisions relating to sovereign guarantees, 
collateral, committal fees and internal rates of return. 
A group of pundits advocate subjecting the infrastructure component of R4I 
contracts to competitive bidding. In principle, competitive bidding increases the probability 
that the host country will get value for money, but it is doubtful this auction mechanism 
will outdo the creative combination by a R4I contract of a resource deal and an 
infrastructure project. 
 
c) Deeds of Security and Payment Clauses 
 
A resource-as-security paradigm prevails in the literature on R4I contracts. The portrayal 
of R4I contracts as pledges or collateralization of natural resources is a distortion in the 
sense that there is hardly any evidence demonstrating such claims (Brautigam, 2009). On 
the contrary, the wordings of R4I contracts indicate that natural resources are intended by 
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the parties to serve as ‘consideration of the construction’ of infrastructure, a phrase 
explicitly used in the Musoshi agreement. In the 2011 Ghana-China R4I contract, the deed 
of security refers to a standby letter of credit, which by no means amounts to the 
collateralization of oil. The same holds for the Sicomines contract, where it is the joint 
venture Sicomines that functions as security. In the overall scheme of R4I contracting, 
natural resources are used as consideration for the loan and the development of 
infrastructure. 
 
d) Local Labor Content 
 
The general consensus of opinion is that in order to maximize the benefits of R4I contracts, 
host states must ensure the largest number of local workers and contractors are hired. 
Media reports have shaped the widely held perception that Chinese investors do not 
employ local workers. These reports are contradicted by the legions of local workers 
visible on construction sites in Angola, Kenya, Ghana, and Cameroon, to mention but a few. 
More often than not, foreign investment laws, labor laws and the licensing regime in the 
host country, though not always respected, impose various obligations on foreign investors 
to employ local workers and/or contractors.  
 
e) Knowledge Transfer 
 
Employment of local workers and contractors normally results in some measure of 
technology, knowledge and skills transfer, even in the absence of specific contractual 
stipulations. However, to make the most of R4I contracts, they must be expressly ‘re-
characterized to facilitate technology and skills transfers’ (Gathii, 2013, pp. 1-2).   
 
f) Quality Specifications 
 
Parties must draw up quality specifications from the outset in the negotiation process. 
They must also write the specifications on technical standards and may plan the post-
contractual management of the infrastructure. In that regard, it may be advisable to hire 
third-party specialist firms to supervise and monitor the construction of infrastructure. If 
the parties lay down, as well they may, that external firms operate and manage the 
infrastructure once construction work is done, they can reap substantial efficiency gains. 
 
g) Stabilization Clauses 
 
Stabilization clauses aim to prevent future changes in the legislation of the host state from 
varying the terms of an investment contract to the detriment of an investing foreign party 
before the contract expires. Whether stabilization clauses are in the interest of the host 
state is an inquiry whose answer hinges on the wording of those clauses. Global Witness 
appraised the text of the stabilization clause in the Sicomines contract as ‘one of the most 
comprehensive and uncompromising’ and as undermining the host-country government’s 
sovereign right to regulate key areas such as taxation or the conservation of the 
environment (2011, p. 32). 
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4. Common Clauses 
 
Common clauses are not part of the analytical framework devised in this article, although a 
number are also salient terms. They are not indispensable to the issue at hand, but they 
nonetheless deserve a cursory outline. R4I deals are investment contracts and, as such, 
deploy the tools foreign investment law has developed and sharpened over the years to 
manage political and commercial risks to protect the interests of host states and foreign 
investors.  
There are investment-specific and general contractual devices to shield foreign 
investors and host states from risks. The general devices endeavor to specify the parties’ 
obligations or investment incentives in each possible state of the world and the sharing of 
risks, gains and losses in each state of the world. Investment-specific devices protect 
foreign investors from political risks by internationalizing investment contracts. These 
devices are stabilization, choice-of-law clauses, arbitration, damages, waiver of sovereign 
immunity, waiver of local remedies exhaustion requirement, currency conversion, profit 
repatriation, interest rates and internal rates of return, force majeure clauses, state interest 
in projects and state-as-party clauses. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The literature search and the framework conducted and created in this research are called 
for by the novelty of the R4I approach. Indeed, knowledge of the subject is still relatively 
embryonic, and a great many experts in international business transactions are unfamiliar 
with this new generation of investment contracts. Meanwhile, the framework presented 
here is broad and has modest ambitions. An in-depth analysis of the clauses of R4I 
contracts is beyond the scope of this article. 
In this research piece, the main submission is that, in the face of a literature limited 
in several material respects, the texts of contractual and official documents define the 
extent and the limits of scientific knowledge on R4I contracts. Through its analytical 
framework, this article worked out what should count as good science and what should be 
cast aside as mere conjecture. 
The framework has laid a solid theoretical foundation that would hopefully enable experts, 
government delegates and other stakeholders (1) to identify R4I contracts by looking for 
the essential terms of international contractual agreements; (2) to analyze and negotiate 
the contracts by perusing the salient terms; and (3) to finalize their dealings by adding the 
common terms of international investment transactions. This article has tried to enrich the 
holey R4I literature by proposing a holistic theory that should help analysts see the whole 
elephant. 
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